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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this Appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(j).

This case

was assigned to the Court of Appeals by Order of the Utah Supreme
Court, dated October 16, 1992.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Was Alumbaugh required to exhaust her remedies under the
Utah Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act prior to bringing her
claims for violation of Federal and State Due Process and breach
of contract?

This issue is purely legal in nature and is, therefore,
reviewable under the correction-of-error standard of review,
St, Benedict's Dev. Co, v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P. 2d
194 (Utah 1991).
2.

Is Alumbaugh excused from exhausting her remedies under

the Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act due to the futility of
such remedies?
This issue is purely legal in nature and is, therefore,
reviewable under the correction-of-error standard of review.
3.

Id.

Did Alumbaugh adequately exhaust her remedies under the

Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act?
This issue is purely legal in nature and is, therefore,
reviewable under the correction-of-error standard of review.
4.

Id.

Has Alumbaugh sufficiently stated a claim for violation

of Federal Due Process under 42 USC Section 1983?
This issue is purely legal in nature and is, therefore,
reviewable under the correction-of-error standard of review.
5.

Id.

Has Alumbaugh sufficiently stated a claim for violation

of Due Process under the Utah Constitution?
This issue is purely legal in nature and is, therefore,
reviewable under the correction-of-error standard of review.
6.

Id.

Has Alumbaugh sufficiently stated a claim for breach of

an implied contract of employment?

- 2 -

This issue is purely legal in nature and is# therefore,
reviewable under the correction-of-error standard of review. Id.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Alumbaugh submits that the following

constitutional

provisions, statutes and rules are determinative of certain
issues in this Appeal. Due to their length, such authorities are
set forth verbatim within the Addendum hereto, at pages 1-13:
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7.
UCA Section 67-19a-101 to 67-19a-408.
Utah Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Alumbaugh alleges in this action that she was involuntarily
transferred from her job position within the Solvency Division of
the Utah State Department of Insurance ("Department of Insurance"
or "Defendant") to a position within the Market Conduct Division
of the Department of Insurance during April of 1990, and that she
was subsequently given an unfavorable written evaluation and
denied an opportunity for a promotion within the Solvency
Division.

Alumbaugh alleges that such acts were in violation of

several Rules of the Utah Department of Human Resource Management
and several provisions of an Employee Handbook which was issued
by the Department of Human Resource Management, and which
governed Alumbaugh's employment with the Department of Insurance.
Alumbaugh alleges that Defendant's violation of such Rules and
- 3 -

Handbook provisions constituted a denial of Alumbaugh's right
of due process under the Constitutions of the United States and
the State of Utah, and breach of an implied contract of
employment.
Alumbaugh filed her Complaint in the District Court,
alleging claims for violation of Federal Due Process and Breach
of Contract on December 26, 1991.

Alumbaugh subsequently filed

an Amended Complaint, which added a claim for violation of State
Due Process.

Defendant filed Motions to Dismiss each of

Alumbaugh's claims on various grounds.

Following the submission

of supporting and opposing memoranda by both parties and oral
argument, the District Court issued its Order of Dismissal, dated
July 10, 1992.

Said Order of Dismissal, a true and correct copy

of which appears in the Addendum hereto at pages 14-15, dismisses
each of Alumbaugh's claims without prejudice for failure to
exhaust administrative and statutory remedies.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1*

During approximately November of 1981 Alumbaugh

commenced her employment as a Grade 13 Office Technician within
the Department of Insurance.

(Amended Complaint, Para. 1;

R. 65.)
2.

Subsequent to the commencement of her employment,

Alumbaugh received several promotions and upgrades, culminating
in her promotion to the position of Grade 15 Insurance Technician
- 4 -

within the Solvency Division of the Utah State Department of
Insurance on or about November 12, 1983*

(Amended Complaint,

Para. 2; R. 65.)
3.

During approximately November of 1989, Vanna Hunter

("Hunter") became employed as Alumbaugh's immediate supervisor
within the Solvency Division.

Also during approximately November

of 1989, Leonard Stillman ("Stillman") became the Director of the
Solvency Division and was Hunter's direct supervisor.

(Amended

Complaint, Para. 3; R. 65.)
4.

Subsequent to the commencement of Hunter's and

Stillman's employment in the Solvency Division, Alumbaugh was
assigned to perform additional responsibilities and was required
to undergo training related to such additional responsibilities.
(Amended Complaint, Para. 4; R. 65.)
5.

On or about February 20, 199 0 Alumbaugh met with

Stillman and informed Stillman that, in Alumbaugh's opinion,
Hunter had not sufficiently communicated Alumbaugh's new job
responsibilities to Alumbaugh, that Hunter had been excessively
critical of Alumbaugh's work performance, and that Hunter had not
adequately trained Alumbaugh in relation to Alumbaugh's new job
responsibilities.

In reply to Alumbaugh's comments, Stillman

asked Alumbaugh if she would like a transfer to a new position.
Alumbaugh inquired as to the specific nature of the transfer, and
Stillman said that he would talk to Personnel Director, Olga
Tsakakis ("Tsakakis"), and would get back to Alumbaugh within
- 5-

thirty

(3 0) d a y s .

transfer,

Alumbaugh t h e n s t a t e d t h a t if she were t o

she would want t o remain within the Solvency D i v i s i o n .

(Amended Complaint, Para. 5; R. 66.)
6.

Several days a f t e r Alumbaugh's meeting with Stillman,

as r e f e r r e d

t o in t h e immediately preceding paragraph hereof,

Alumbaugh contacted Tsakakis r e g a r d i n g t h e p o t e n t i a l
that

Stillman

had p r o p o s e d .

In response

to

Alumbaugh's

statement, Tsakakis said t h a t she was unaware of any
o p p o r t u n i t i e s e x i s t i n g a t t h a t time.

transfer

transfer

Tsakakis f u r t h e r

stated

t h a t any proposed t r a n s f e r would r e q u i r e input from the employee
who was to be t r a n s f e r r e d .
7.

(Amended Complaint, Para. 6; R. 66.)

On or about March 20, 199 0 Alumbaugh was c a l l e d i n t o a

meeting w i t h Commissioner Harold C. Yancey ("Yancey"),
which Yancey s t a t e d t h a t Hunter had informed him of
alleged deficiencies

during
certain

in Alumbaugh's work performance and t h a t

Yancey wanted Alumbaugh t o t r a n s f e r

t o a Grade 15 I n s u r a n c e

T e c h n i c i a n p o s i t i o n w i t h i n t h e Market Conduct Division, which
position

was t h e n

h e l d by e m p l o y e e

Sandra

Christensen

( " C h r i s t e n s e n " ) , and t h a t Christensen would be t r a n s f e r r e d
Alumbaugh's p o s i t i o n in the Solvency Department.
Yancey's s t a t e m e n t ,

to

In response t o

Alumbaugh asked what would happen if

she

refused the t r a n s f e r , upon which Yancey s t a t e d t h a t if Alumbaugh
chose to remain in her current p o s i t i o n , and did not meet the job
specifications

for t h a t p o s i t i o n w i t h i n s i x

(6) t o e i g h t

months, Alumbaugh1s employment would be terminated.
- 6 -

(8)

Yancey then

gave Alumbaugh a copy of the job description for the position in
the Market Conduct Division, to which he proposed to transfer
Alumbaugh.

Upon review of said job description, Alumbaugh stated

to Yancey that the transfer was a demotion, in response to which
Yancey stated that the position was not a demotion because
Alumbaugh would not lose any wages or benefits.

Alumbaugh then

stated that she would accept the transfer under protest because
it was apparent that Yancey intended to terminate Alumbaugh's
employment if she did not accept the transfer. Alumbaugh further
stated that she would file a grievance in relation to the
transfer.
8.

(Amended Complaint, Para. 7; R. 66-67.)
On or about April 3, 1990 Alumbaugh commenced her

employment as a Grade 15 Insurance Technician within the Market
Conduct Division.

Upon information and belief, Christensen

commenced work in Alumbaugh1s former position within the Solvency
Division on the same date.

(Amended Complaint, Para. 8;

R. 67-68.)
9.

On or about April 6, 1990 Alumbaugh filed a grievance,

pursuant to the Utah Grievance and Appeals Procedure Act, UCA
Section 67-19a-101 et seq., in which Alumbaugh alleged that her
transfer to the Market Conduct Division was involuntary, was
implemented without sufficient notice of any deficiency in
Alumbaugh's work performance and without affording Alumbaugh an
opportunity to improve any deficiency in her work performance, in
- 7 -

violation of various rules and policies of the Department of
Insurance and the Department of Human Resource Management.
(Amended Complaint, Para. 9; R. 68.)
10.

On or about April 9, 1991 Alumbaugh was given a written

Performance Evaluation which had been prepared by Hunter, and
which purported to review Alumbaugh1s work performance during the
period of October 1, 1989 to April

1, 1990.

While such

evaluation rated Alumbaugh's overall work performance as
"successful," the evaluation contained several statements which
were highly critical of Alumbaugh's work performance.

Subsequent

to the issuance of said evaluation, Alumbaugh alleged within her
grievance that such evaluation had been issued in retaliation for
the filing of her grievance.

(Amended Complaint, Para. 10;

R. 68.)
11.

On or about September 5, 1990 Christensen was promoted

to the position of Grade 19 Insurance Forms Technician within the
Department of Insurance.

Upon information and belief, such

promotion was implemented in a manner which was not consistent
with established policies of the Department of Insurance and the
Utah Department of Human Resource Management, in that such
promotion was not authorized by the Department of Human Resource
Management, and in that Christensen was pre-selected for the
position

to the exclusion of other qualified

applicants, including Alumbaugh.
R. 68-69.)
- 8 -

potential

(Amended Complaint, Para. 11;

12.

On or about October 26, 1990, Alumbaugh's former

position of Grade 15 Insurance Technician within the Solvency
Division, which Christensen had held prior to her promotion
to Insurance Forms Technician, was "reclassified" to a Grade 15
Secretary position.
13.

(Amended Complaint, Para. 12; R. 69.)

Upon information and belief, the Grade 19 Insurance

Forms Technician and the Grade 15 Secretary position, which
were created subsequent to Alumbaugh's transfer from the Solvency
Division, each performed some of the duties which Alumbaugh
previously performed as a Grade 15 Insurance Technician within
the Solvency Division.
14.

(Amended Complaint, Para. 13; R. 69.)

The position to which Alumbaugh was transferred within

the Market Conduct Division, on or about April 3, 1990, requires
less technical expertise, and provides fewer opportunities for
advancement and promotion than Alumbaugh's former position in
the Solvency Division.
15.

(Amended Complaint, Para. 14; R. 69.)

Following the filing of Alumbaugh's grievance, said

grievance proceeded through the first four levels of appeal
as specified by the Utah Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act, UCA
47-19a-402, which consisted of review by Alumbaugh's

line

management, who held that Plaintiff's transfer had been
voluntary.

(Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
- 9 -

Motion to Dismiss [hereinafter cited as "Plaintiff's Memo"], page
3; R. 27.J1
16,

On May 11, 1990 Alumbaugh filed a request with the

Utah Career Service Review Board to advance her grievance to
Level 5 pursuant to UCA Section 67-19a-402 (5) .

(Plaintiff's

Memo., pages 3-4; R. 27-28.)
17.

On May 21, 1990 the Career Service Review Board,

per Administrator Robert,N. White, issued a Jurisdictional
Decision and Summary Ruling ("Jurisdictional Decision"), which
held in essence that the Career Service Review Board had no
jurisdiction over Alumbaugh1s claims pursuant to UCA Section
67-19a-3Q2(1).

Said Jurisdictional Decision states in part:

^Alumbaugh's grievance proceeding culminated in a summary
ruling by the Utah Career Service Review Board that the Board
lacked jurisdiction over Alumbaugh 1 s claims. Alumbaugh
subsequently appealed the decision of the Career Service Review
Board to the Utah Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held
that the Jurisdictional Decision of the Career Service Review
Board constituted an informal adjudicative determination pursuant
to UCA Section 63-46b-15, for which review must be sought in the
District Court, rather than in the Court of Appeals. See
Alumbaugh v. White, 800 P.2d 825 (Utah App. 1990). Alumbaugh
subsequently filed a Petition for Review of the Career Service
Review Board's decision in the Third District Court. See
Alumbaugh v. White, Case No. 910902395AA. Said Petition for
Review was dismissed without prejudice on November 18, 1992.
Alumbaugh1s grievance proceeding and related appeals to the
Utah Court of Appeals and the District Court are hereinafter
collectively referred to as "Alumbaugh I." Alumbaugh respectfull
requests that this Court take judicial notice of the records and
files in Alumbaugh I pursuant to Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
- 10 -

[I]t is concluded that Grievant's requested remedies
are inappropriate to the Grievance Procedures based on
the following:

(a)
R e q u e s t s for desk a u d i t s and all
classification appeals are not within the scope of the
Insurance Department, but require application to DHRM
(Section 67-19-31 and R468-4-5), nor do these matters
come under the jurisdiction of the CSRB.
(b) The CSRB lacks remedy powers over monetary
awards for embarrassment and emotional distress. Such
complaints may be petitioned through the general
courts. The CSRB may not even award attorney's fees.
(Section 67-19a-408 (4).)
(c) Any future salary increases are a prospective
(future-oriented) matter, and the award or lack of
award of future increases can only be treated at the
time of occurrence. Grievant's requested remedy anent
future salary increases is now premature. A grievance
may always be filed coincident with any future award or
the denial of an award on salary increase matters, but
there is no present injury or harm cited in the instant

grievance which may be treated at this time.
(Plaintiff's Memo., Exhibit "A," R. 47-54.)2
18.

On June 19, 1990 Alumbaugh filed a Petition for

Review in the Utah Court of Appeals, in which Alumbaugh sought
reversal of Administrator White's Jurisdictional Decision.

On

October 20, 19 9 0 the Court of Appeals issued an opinion which
held, in essence, that the Jurisdictional Decision and Summary
Decision of the Career Service Review Board constituted an
informal adjudicative proceeding, for which review must be sought
in the District Court, rather than in the Court of Appeals,
^A true and correct copy of said Jurisdictional Decision is
contained within the Addendum hereto at pages 16-23.

- 11 -

pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 63-46d-5.

Therefore,

Alumbaugh's Petition for Review was transferred by the Court of
Appeals to the Third District Court.
P.2d 825 (Utah, App. 1990).
19.

See Alumbaugh v. White, 800

(Plaintiff's Memo., page 5; R. 29.)

On April 12, 1991 Alumbaugh filed a Petition for

Review of the May 21, 199 0 Jurisdictional Decision and Summary
Ruling in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, Case No. 910902395AA.

(Plaintiff's Memo., page 5; R. 29.)

Alumbaugh's grievance proceeding under the Grievance and Appeal
Procedures Act and related appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals
and the District Court are collectively referred to herein as
"Alumbaugh 1."
20.

On September 24, 1991 Alumbaugh filed in Alumbaugh

I_ a Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint which, in
essence, sought to add some of the claims which Alumbaugh has
alleged in the present action (i.e., for violation of Federal Due
Process and breach of contract) to her Petition for Review of the
Jurisdictional Decision.

The Defendant opposed said Motion,

asserting that Alumbaugh could not join such claims with her
Petition

for Review.

On November

8, 1991 the Court

in

Alumbaugh I issued its Minute Entry, which denied Alumbaugh's
Motion

for Leave

to File

a Second

(Plaintiff's Memo., pages 5-6; R. 29-30.)

- 12 -

Amended

Complaint.

-41.

Alumbaugh commenced t h e p r e s e n t a c t i o n on December

26, 1991.
Action:

Alumbaugh's o r i g i n a l Complaint alleged two Causes of
for v i o l a t i o n of Federal Due Process pursuant t o 42 USC

Section 1983 and for breach of c o n t r a c t .
22.

On F e b r u a r y 24, 1992 Defendant

filed

a Motion

to

Dismiss both Causes of Action within Alumbaugh1s Complaint on the
following grounds:
(a) That a s t a t e cannot be held l i a b l e under 42 USC
Section 1983.
(b)

That

the

g o v e r n e d by s t a t u t e

t e r m s of Alumbaugh 1 s employment

and r u l e ;

therefore,

no

are

contractual

o b l i g a t i o n could e x i s t between Alumbaugh and Defendant.
(c) That Alumbaugh has not exhausted her a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
remedies inasmuch as the J u r i s d i c t i o n a l Decision of the Career
Service Review Board i s c u r r e n t l y on review in t h e
Court.
23.

District

(R. 13-23.)
On March l l f

1992 Alumbaugh f i l e d

a Memorandum in

Opposition t o D e f e n d a n t ' s Motion t o D i s m i s s , d a t e d March 1 1 ,
199 2, wherein Alumbaugh contested each of the a s s e r t e d grounds
for

dismissal

within

Defendant's

Motion

to

Dismiss.

S p e c i f i c a l l y , Alumbaugh argued:
(a)

That

exhaustion

of

remedies

under

the

Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act i s not a p r e r e q u i s i t e
the a s s e r t i o n of her c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and contract claims.
- 13 -

Utah
for

(b) That
exhaustion

Alumbaugh

requirement

should

because

be

excused

the Grievance

from

and

any

Appeal

Procedures Act provides no remedy to Alumbaugh and exhaustion of
such procedures would be futile.
(c) That Alumbaugh has exhausted any remedy which
she may be required to exhaust under the Grievance and Appeal
Procedures Act.
(d) That Alumbaugh has sufficiently stated a claim for
injunctive relief under 42 USC Section 1983.
(e) That Alumbaugh has sufficiently stated a claim for
breach of contract.
24.

(R. 25-56.)

On March 17, 1992 Alumbaugh filed an Amended Complaint

which was identical to her original Complaint, except that it
added a Third Cause of Action for violation of Due Process under
the Utah State Constitution.
25.

(R. 64-74.)

On March 24, 1992 Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss

the Third Cause of Action within Alumbaugh1s Amended Complaint on
the grounds that a claim based upon the Utah Constitution should
not be recognized where the Utah Grievance and Appeal Procedures
Act provides a remedy for the injuries claimed by Alumbaugh.
(R. 75-86.)
26.

Following

the submission

of responsive

memoranda

by both parties, Defendant's Motions to Dismiss came for hearing
before

the District

Court, the Honorable Richard J. Moffat
- 14 -

presiding, on June 12, 1992.

After oral argument, Judge Moffat

ruled that Alumbaugh had not exhausted her administrative and
statutory remedies, and that Alumbaugh1s Amended Complaint was,
therefore, dismissed without prejudice.
27.

(R. 122.)

On July 10, 1992 the District Court, per Judge Moffat,

issued its Order of Dismissal, which constitutes the final order
from which this Appeal is taken.
in relevant part:

Said Order of Dismissal states

"Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Amended

Complaint is granted for the reason that Plaintiff has failed to
exhaust the administrative and statutory remedies for the review
of grievance procedures."

{R. 123-124.)

(See Addendum, pages

14-15.)
28.

On November 18, 1992 the District Court, per the

Honorable David S. Young, dismissed the Petition for Review in
Alumbaugh I without prejudice, for the reason that Alumbaugh
wishes

to hold

such

Petition

in abeyance pending

the

determination of her rights in this Appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Alumbaugh was not required to exhaust any remedy which she
may have under the Utah Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act prior
to bringing suit upon her constitutional and contract claims.
The Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act contains no provision
limiting the availability of constitutional or common law
- 15 -

remedies*

To the contrary, the language of the act is

consistently permissive in nature, e.g., "the employee may submit
the grievance in writing to the administrator. . . . "
Section 67-19a-402(5) (emphasis added).

UCA

Further, the Grievance

and Appeal Procedures Act has no application to Alumbaugh's claim
for violation of Federal Due Process under 42 USC Section 1983.
POINT II
Even if exhaustion of remedies under the Grievance and
Appeal Procedures Act is required in some circumstances, it
should not be required in the present case.

As it appears from

the express provisions of the Act, and as reflected within
the Career Service Review Board's Jurisdictional Decision, the
Board lacks authority to order any substantive relief for the
injuries alleged by Alumbaugh

in this case.

Therefore,

exhaustion of such remedies would be futile.
POINT III
Even if Alumbaugh was required to exhaust her remedies under
the Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act, she has already done so,
by processing her grievance to the Career Service Review Board,
which has held that it lacks jurisdiction over Alumbaugh's
claims.

Alumbaugh's only remaining recourse is to the District

Court, where she should be allowed to bring any claims which she
may have arising from her alleged injuries.

- 16 -

POINT IV
Alumbaugh has sufficiently stated a claim for violation of
Federal Due Process. Defendant has argued that a cause of action
under 42 USC Section 1983 is unavailable against the State of
Utah, and Alumbaugh has contested this point.

Although the

District Court did not expressly decide this issue, this issue
was raised within the District Court and is potentially
dispositive of Alumbaugh's Federal Due Process claim.
POINT V
Alumbaugh has sufficiently stated a claim for violation of
State Due Process. Defendant argued in the District Court that a
cause of action under the Due Process clause of the Utah
Constitution should not be recognized where a statutory remedy
exists for the alleged injuries. However, Alumbaugh submits that
she has no substantive remedy under the Grievance and Appeal
Procedures Act and must therefore be allowed a cause of action
under the Utah Constitution.

Although the District Court did not

expressly decide this issue, this issue was raised within the
District Court and is potentially dispositive of Alumbaugh's
State Due Process claim.
POINT VI
Alumbaugh has sufficiently stated a claim for breach of
contract.

Defendant argued in the District Court that a breach

of contract claim is unavailable where the terms and conditions
- 17 -

of employment are governed by statute or rule, and Alumbaugh has
contested

this point.

expressly

Although the District Court did

decide this issue, this issue was raised

not

in the

District Court and is potentially dispositive of Alumbaugh's
breach of contract claim.
ARGUMENT
I . THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
CLAIMS FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST REMEDIES
A.

Alumbaugh Was Not R e q u i r e d t o E x h a u s t Her R e m e d i e s U n d e r

t h e Utah Grievance

and Appeal

Her C o n s t i t u t i o n a l

and C o n t r a c t

Defendant
should

ALUMBAUGH'S

argued

be required

in

Procedures

to

Asserting

Claims.

the District

to exhaust

Act P r i o r

Court

that

her remedies under

Alumbaugh

the

Grievance

a n d A p p e a l P r o c e d u r e s A c t , UCA S e c t i o n 6 7 - 1 9 a - 1 0 1 , e t s e q . ,
to

bringing

Memorandum

her
in

("Defendant's
of

3-6,

Support

of

and

contract

Defendant's

claims.

Motion

to

Motion t o Dismiss

21-23

(R. 5 9 - 6 2 ) .

("Defendant's
However,

Reply

Defendant

See

Dismiss

Memo," p a g e s 7 - 9 ) , a n d R e p l y Memorandum i n

Defendant's

pages

constitutional

prior

Support

Memo."),
cited

no

r e a s o n o r a u t h o r i t y i n s u p p o r t of s u c h p o s i t i o n .
I n H a t t o n - W a r d v . S a l t Lake C i t y C o r p o r a t i o n ,
182 U t a h Adv. R e p . 44
plaintiff
in

this

Court

held

was n o t r e q u i r e d t o e x h a u s t h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e

the Civil

action

(Utah App. 1 9 9 2 ) ,

828 P . 2 d 1 0 7 1 ,

under

Service

Commission

prior

the State whistle-blower

the Court s t a t e d a t page 1073:
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to bringing
statute.

a

In so

that

a

remedies
judicial
holding,

N o t h i n g i n t h e language of t h e c i v i l s e r v i c e
s t a t u t e empowers the Commission to hear c e r t a i n claims
specified in the w h i s t l e blower s t a t u t e such as t h r e a t s
and d i s c r i m i n a t i o n made in r e t a l i a t i o n f o r w h i s t l e
blowing.
N e i t h e r does t h e language of t h e c i v i l
s e r v i c e s t a t u t e s u g g e s t t h a t t h e Commission i s
empowered t o p r o v i d e any remedy o t h e r than t h o s e
r e l a t e d to r e i n s t a t e m e n t .
In p a r t i c u l a r ,
the
Commission i s barred from granting a t t o r n e y fees, which
may be awarded in the w h i s t l e blower s t a t u t e , as well
as c i v i l damages, and c i v i l f i n e s .
We n o t e t h a t h e r e , Hatton-Ward i s not s e e k i n g
r e i n s t a t e m e n t , b u t r a t h e r c i v i l damages and a t t o r n e y
f e e s . Thus, i t makes no sense to r e q u i r e him f i r s t t o
go t o t h e Commission t o pursue a remedy he does not
want. The law does not r e q u i r e t h e e x h a u s t i o n of
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e remedies when i t would serve no useful
purpose. Moreover, once an employee brings an a c t i o n
before the Commission, he or she i s then e n t i t l e d only
t o a review of whether t h e Commission exceeded i t s
d i s c r e t i o n and j u r i s d i c t i o n . We thus see nothing in
t h e p l a i n and unambiguous l a n g u a g e of e i t h e r t h e
w h i s t l e blower s t a t u t e or t h e c i v i l service s t a t u t e
suggesting a claimant must f i r s t bring a w h i s t l e blower
claim t o t h e Commission b e f o r e p r o c e e d i n g in s t a t e
c o u r t . (Citations d e l e t e d . )
The r e a s o n i n g which was applied in Hatton-Ward i s equally
compelling in the present c a s e .
which was a t

issue

Like the Civil Service s t a t u t e

in Hatton-Ward,

t h e remedies which

are

authorized under t h e Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act a r e
very l i m i t e d .

The only p r o v i s i o n s of

t h e Act which may be

construed as authorizing any remedy are UCA Section 67-19a-408,
which i m p l i e s

that

t h e Board may o r d e r t h e placement of a

grievant on the reappointment r o s t e r and back wages and b e n e f i t s ,
and 67-19a-303 (4) (c), which implies t h a t the Board may rescind
any d i s c i p l i n a r y action against an employee.
remedy r e l a t i n g

to a l l e g e d l y

The Act contains no

non-disciplinary

r e t a l i a t o r y evaluations or p r e - s e l e c t e d promotions.
- 19 -

transfers,

The Career Service Review Board's Jurisdictional Decision in
this case emphasized

its inability to order any type of

substantive relief for the injuries alleged by Alumbaugh.
Specifically, the Administrator held that he lacks authority to
award monetary damages or prospective relief*

(R. 47-54.)

(See

Addendum at pages 22-23•)
Given these limitations upon the remedies under the
Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act, it is clear that the Act was
not intended to provide relief for the type of constitutional and
rule violations which Alumbaugh alleges in this case.3

There is

nothing within the Act which can reasonably be construed as
supplanting or limiting other remedies which may be available
outside of the Act.
Even if exhaustion of remedies under the Grievance and
Appeal Procedures Act is required in some circumstances, it
should not be applied to Alumbaugh1 s Federal Due Process claim
under 42 USC Section 1983.

It is generally held that exhaustion

of state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to claims
under Section 1983.
S.C.T. 2510, 2524

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n., 110

(1990); Stana v. School Dist. of City of

Pittsburgh, 775 F.2d

122, 129-130

(3rd Cir. 1985)? Holmes

v. Wampler, 546 F.Supp. 500-503 (E.D. Va. 1982).

Defendant did

^Defendant has not argued that it did not violate the Rules
and Employee Handbook provisions as Alumbaugh alleges, nor has
Defendant argued that Alumbaugh does not have a constitutionally
protected property and liberty interest in her employment.
- 20 -

not address this point in the District Court, and the District
Court's dismissal of Alumbaugh's Section 1983 claim was clearly
erroneous.
B.

Alumbaugh Should be Excused from Exhausting Her Remedies

Under the Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act Due to the Futility
of Such Remedies.
As the Court noted in Hat t on -Ward, 828 P. 2d at 1073, "The
law does not require the exhaustion of administrative remedies
when it would serve no useful purpose."

In the present case, any

procedures to which Alumbaugh may be entitled under the Grievance
and Appeal

Procedures

Act

are

rendered

futile by the

unavailability of any substantive remedy under the Act*
Defendant argued in the District Court that, contrary to the
ruling of the Career Service Review Board, Alumbaugh's claims
fall within the Board's jurisdiction,

(R. 59-62.)

Alumbaugh

agrees that the Board's ruling as to jurisdiction is erroneous,
and that the Board probably does have jurisdiction over
Alumbaugh's claims pursuant to UCA Section 67-19a-302 (1) .
However, the important point is that, even if the Board has
jurisdiction, it lacks statutory authority to order any relief
for all or most of the injuries which Alumbaugh alleges.
Alumbaugh should not be required to exhaust a procedure which,
though available, provides no adequate remedy.

- 21 -

c#

Alumbaugh Has Sufficiently Exhausted Her Administrative

Remedy.
Alumbaugh argued in the District Court that she sufficiently
exhausted her administrative remedies before filing the present
action

(R. 9 7 ) . Alumbaugh processed her grievance through the

first four levels as required by UCA Section 67-19a-402.
Alumbaugh then sought review by the Career Service Review Board
pursuant

to 67-19a-403.

jurisdiction.

The Board

ruled

that

it

lacks

After such ruling, Alumbaugh1s sole recourse is to

the District Court, where Alumbaugh should be allowed to bring
any claim which she has arising from the alleged injuries.
Alumbaugh fully exhausted her administrative procedures under the
Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act.
All of the cases which Defendant has cited on the exhaustion
issue involve situations wherein the petitioner sought Court
review of an agency decision before the agency had
completed its processing of the claim.

fully

(See Defendant's Memo,

pages 7-8, R. 21-22 and cases cited therein.)

Such is not the

situation in the present case, where the Career Service Review
Board has reached a final determination upon Alumbaugh's claims.
Defendant has not addressed the issue of whether Alumbaugh has in
fact exhausted her administrative remedies.
II. ALUMBAUGH HAS SUFFICIENTLY STATED A CLAIM UNDER 42 USC
SECTION 1983
Defendant argued in the District Court that a cause of
action under 42 USC Section 1983 will not lie against the State
- 22 -

of Utah (R.17).

In support of this position, Defendant cites the

U.S. Supreme Court case of Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
However, as Alumbaugh observed in the District Court, Will only
prohibits an award of damages against state governments under
Section 1983. Will does not alter the long-established rule that
injunctive relief may be ordered against a state under Section
1983.

Will v. Michigan, 491 U.S. at 71, note 10.
In response to this point, Defendant argued in the District

Court that the injunctive relief which Alumbaugh seeks in this
case is not "prospective, " and therefore may not be obtained
under Section 1983. Defendant states on page 2 of its Reply Memo
(R. 58):
In the instant case, plaintiff's complaint does
not seek prospective relief. Rather, plaintiff
requests this Court to adjudicate whether the State
violated her due process rights when she was
transferred to another position of employment within
the State agency.
Defendant has identified no meaningful distinction between
the type of injunctive relief which Alumbaugh seeks in this case
and the type of injunctive relief which is typically awarded
under Section 1983. Defendant erroneously states that injunctive
relief under Section 1983 is limited to "declaratory" injunctive
relief, and not "compensatory" injunctive relief.
Reply Memo, page 2, note 1, R. 58.)

(Defendant's

However, the cases decided

under Section 1983 reflect no such distinction, nor has Defendant
cited any authority in support of this assertion.
- 23 -

Alumbaugh has

sufficiently stated a claim for injunctive relief under Section
1983.
III. ALUMBAUGH HAS SUFFICIENTLY STATED A CLAIM FOR VIOLATION
OF DUE PROCESS UNDER THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a claim under the Due
Process clause of the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7,
may arise in the public employment context.

Worrall v. Ogden

City Fire Department, 616 P.2d 598 (Utah 1980).
Defendant conceded in the District Court that such a claim
may be available in some circumstances, but argued that such a
claim should not be recognized where the Plaintiff has available
a statutory remedy which adequately vindicates the asserted
constitutional right.

(R. 81-82.)

Alumbaugh does not disagree with the general proposition
stated by Defendant.

However, Alumbaugh submits that she has no

adequate statutory remedy in this case and that, as a result, she
has sufficiently stated a claim under the Utah Constitution.
IV. ALUMBAUGH HAS SUFFICIENTLY STATED A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF
IMPLIED CONTRACT
Alumbaugh argued in the District Court that the Rules and
Employee Handbook, which were promulgated by the Utah Department
of Human Resource Management, and which governed Alumbaugh1 s
employment with the Department of Insurance, established an
implied contract of employment pursuant to Berube v. Fashion
Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).
- 24 -

(R. 39-40.)

Defendant's only argument on this issue is that no implied
contract of employment
relationship

can exist where

the employment

is governed by statute and rule

(R. 17-21) •

However, all of the cases which Defendant has cited on this point
involve situations in which the Plaintiff sought to enforce a
contract which was in conflict with a controlling statute, e.g.,
Lamborn v. Jessop, 631 P.2d 917 (Utah 1981).

In the present

case, Alumbaugh seeks to enforce an implied contract which is
entirely consistent with and in fact arises from the Rules and
Handbook which have been promulgated by the Department of Human
Resource Management pursuant to its statutory

authority.

Defendant has made no argument that the contractual rights
asserted by Alumbaugh are in any way inconsistent with her
statutory rights.
In Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063
(Utah 1981), the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's Personnel
Policies and Procedures had created an implied contract of
employment, which had been violated by defendant in terminating
the plaintiff's employment.

In upholding the District Court's

Judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the Utah Supreme Court
stated:
T h i s finding comports with the numerous holdings t h a t
an educational i n s t i t u t i o n may undertake a c o n t r a c t u a l
o b l i g a t i o n to observe p a r t i c u l a r
termination
f o r m a l i t i e s by adopting procedures or by promulgating
r u l e s and r e g u l a t i o n s g o v e r n i n g t h e employment
relationship.
(Citations deleted.)
-
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The Piacitelli Court proceeded to distinguish between the
plaintiff's claims under 42 USC Section 1983 and for breach of
contract, and awarded the plaintiff lost wages exclusively under
the contract theory.

Id. at 1068-1070.

Defendant attempts to distinguish Piacitelli on page 5 of
its Reply Memo (R. 61) , by stating that teaching positions are
exempted from the State career service provisions pursuant to UCA
Section 67-19-15(h).

While this is true, it is equally true that

teaching positions are subject to extensive statutory control.
For example, UCA Section 53A-8-101 et. seq. establishes a detailed
administrative procedures for employment-related

grievances

pertaining to teaching positions, yet the existence of such
remedies did not defeat the Plaintiff's contract claim in
Piacitelli.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing authorities, facts and argument,
Alumbaugh respectfully requests that this Honorable Court reverse
the District Court's Order of Dismissal in its entirety and
remand this case to the District Court for consideration of the
merits of Alumbaugh's claims.
DATED this

/ 5 day of January, 1993.
PERKINS,^, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN

DAVID W. 3THWOBE
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM
Page No,
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, Section 7

1

Utah Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act,
UCA Section 67-19a-101-67-19a-408
Order of Dismissal, dated July 10, 1992

2-13
14-17

Jurisdictional Decision and Summary Ruling,
dated May 21, 1990

18-23

Art. I, § 6

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Question in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Petitioner Is Released Prior to Final Abjudication, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265.
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscientious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328.
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Corpus §§ 5 to 7.

C.J.S. — 16A CJ.S. Constitutional Law
§ 472 et seq.; 39 CJ.S. Habeas Corpus 9 5.
A.L.R. — Anticipatory relief in federal
courts against state criminal prosecutions
growing out of civil rights activities, 8
A.L.R.3d 301.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «=»
83(1), 121 to 123.

Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms.
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.),
S.J.R. 3.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate

Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amend
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Regulation of right to bear arms.
This section gives sufficient authority for the
legislature to forbid the possession of dangerous weapons by those who are not citizens, or
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incompetent. State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah
1974).

ANALYSIS

Prospective application.
Regulation of right to bear arms.
Prospective application.
The amendment to this provision by Laws
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3
is to be given prospective application only.
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?,
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons
and Firearms § 4.
CJ.S. — 16A CJ.S. Constitutional Law
§ 511; 94 CJ.S. Weapons § 2.

A.L.R. — Gun control laws, validity and
construction of, 28 A.LJL3d 845.
Validity of statute proscribing possession or
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «=» 82;
Weapons *= 1, 3, 6 et seq.

Sec, 7. [Due process of law,]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
History: Const 1896.
Cross-References. — Eminent domain generally, § 78-34-1 et seq.

64
- 1 -

GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL PROCEDURES

67-19-40

came effective on April 23, 1990, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

History: C. 1953, 67-19-38, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 280, § 7.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 280 be-

67-19-39. Exemptions.
Peace officers, as defined under Section 77-la-l, acting in their official
capacity as peace officers in undercover roles and assignments, are exempt
from the provisions of this act.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 280 became effective on April 23, 1990, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

History: C. 1953, 67-19-39, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 280, § 8.
Meaning of "this act" — The phrase "this
act" means Laws 1990, ch. 280 which enacted
§§ 67-19-33 through 67-19-39.

67-19-40. State benefits for servicemembers activated due
to Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert
Storm.
(1) All agencies may continue to pay, for employees activated due to Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, their portion of:
(a) the premium for health and dental insurance; and
(b) the premium for the basic life insurance provided by the state.
(2) All agencies may also grant the 15-day military leave for employees
activated due to Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm.
History: C. 1953, 67-19-40, enacted by L.
1991, ch. 253, § 2.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 253 be-

came effective on April 29, 1991, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

CHAPTER 19a
GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL
PROCEDURES
Part 3
Grievance and Appeal Procedures
Section
67-19a-301. Charges submissible under
grievance and appeals procedure.
67-19a-302. Levels of appealability of
charges submissible under
grievance and appeals procedure.
67-19a-303. Employees' rights in grievance
and appeals procedure.

Part 1
General Provisions
Section
67-19a-101.

Definitions.
Part 2

Career Service Review Board
67-19a-201.

67-19a-202.
67-19a-203.
67-19a-204.

Career Service Review Board
created — Members — Appointment — Removal —
Terms — Organization —
Compensation.
Powers — Jurisdiction.
Rulemaking authority.
Administrator — Powers.

Part 4
Procedural Steps to Be Followed by
Aggrieved Employee
67-19a-40L Time limits for submission of
143
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67-19a-101

STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

Section

67-19a-402.
67-19a-403.
67-19a-404.
67-19a-405.

appeal by aggrieved employee — Voluntary termination of employment — Group
grievances.
Procedural steps to be followed
by aggrieved employee.
Appeal to administrator — Jurisdictional hearing.
Administrator's
responsibilities.
Prehearing conference.

Section
67-19a-406.

67-19a-407.
67-19a-408.

Procedural steps to be followed
by aggrieved employee —
Hearing before hearing officer — Evidentiary and procedural rules.
Appeal to Career Service Review Board.
Career Service Review Board
hearing — Evidentiary and
procedural rules.

PART 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
67-19a-101. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Administrator" means the person employed by the board to assist
in administering personnel policies.
(2) "Board" means the Career Service Review Board created by this
chapter.
(3) "Career service employee" means a person employed in career service as defined in Section 67-19-3.
(4) "Employer" means the state of Utah and all supervisory personnel
vested with the authority to implement and administer the policies of the
department.
(5) "Grievance" means:
(a) a complaint by a career service employee concerning any matter touching upon the relationship between the employee and his
employer; and
(b) any dispute between a career service employee and his employer.
(6) "Supervisor" means the person to whom an employee reports and
who assigns and oversees the employee's work.
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-101, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 6; 1991, ch. 101, § 2; 1991,
ch. 204, § 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment by ch. 101, effective April 29,1991, added
present Subsection (3); designated former Subsections (3) to (5) as present Subsections (4) to
(6); and substituted "the policies of the department" for "the state's personnel policies" at the
end of present Subsection (4).

The 1991 amendment by ch. 204, effective
April 29, 1991, substituted "a career service"
for "an" in present Subsections (5)(a) and
(5)(b).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
OfBce of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 became effective on Apnl 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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67-19a-201

PART 2
•CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD
67-19a-201. Career Service Review Board created — Members — Appointment — Removal — Terms — Organization — Compensation.
(1) There is created a Career Service Review Board.
(2) (a) The governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint five members to the board no more than three of which are members
of the same political party.
(b) The governor shall appoint members whose gender and ethnicity
represent the career service work force.
(c) The governor may remove any board member for cause and appoint
a replacement to complete the unexpired term of the member removed for
cause.
(3) The governor shall ensure that appointees to the board:
(a) are qualified by knowledge of employee relations and merit system
principles in public employment; and
(b) are not:
(i) members of any local, state, or national committee of a political
party;
(ii) officers or members of a committee in any partisan political
club; and
(iii) holding or a candidate for a paid public office.
(4) (a) The governor shall appoint board members to serve four-year terms
as follows:
(i) three members shall be appointed to a term beginning and ending with the governor's term; and
(ii) two members shall be appointed to four-year terms beginning
January 1 of the third year of the governor's regular term in office.
(b) The members of the board shall serve until their successors are
appointed and qualified.
(c) Persons serving on the board as of the effective date of this act may
complete the term for which they were appointed.
(d) If a vacancy occurs on the board, the governor may appoint a new
person to fill the unexpired term.
(5) Each year, the board shall choose a chairman and vice-chairman from
its own members.
(6) (a) Three members of the board are a quorum for the transaction of
business.
(b) Action by a majority of members when a quorum is present is action
of the board.
(7) Members of the board shall serve without compensation, but they may
be reimbursed for expenses incurred in the performance of their official duties
as established by the Division of Finance.
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67-19a-202

STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

History: C. 1953, 67-19a-201, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 7.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-

came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

67-19a-202. Powers — Jurisdiction.
(1) (a) The board shall serve as the final administrative body to review
appeals from career service employees and agencies of decisions about
promotions, dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written reprimands,
wages, salary, violations of personnel rules, issues concerning the equitable administration of benefits, reductions in force, and disputes concerning abandonment of position that have not been resolved at an earlier
stage in the grievance procedure.
(b) The board has no jurisdiction to review or decide any other personnel matters.
(2) The time limits established in this chapter supersede the procedural
time limits established in Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures
Act.
(3) In conjunction with any inquiry, investigation, hearing, or other proceeding, any member of the board may:
(a) administer oaths;
(b) certify official acts;
(c) subpoena witnesses, documents, and other evidence; and
(d) grant continuances pursuant to board rule.
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-202, enacted by "employees" in Subsection (l)(a), and "AdminL. 1989, ch. 191, § 8; 1991, ch. 101, § 3; 1991, istrative Procedures Act" after "Title 63" in
ch. 204, § 8.
Subsection (2).
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendThis section is set out as reconciled by the
mentbych. 101, effective April 29,1991, added office of Legislative Research and General
Subsection (3)(d), making a related grammati- Counsel,
cal change, and made a change in the style of
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 beth cha
L Pn e !* r e f e r e n c e i ? . S u b ? c S ? ? ( 2 i: ..
came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
The 1991 amendment by ch. 204, effective U t a h C ( ) n g t Art VI Sec 25
April 29,1991, inserted "career service" before
''
'

67-19a-203. Rulemaking authority.
The board may make rules governing:
(1) definitions of terms, phrases, and words used in the grievance process established by this chapter;
(2) what matters constitute excusable neglect for purposes of the
waiver of time limits established by this chapter;
(3) the application for and service of subpoenas, the service and filing
of pleadings, and the issuance of rulings, orders, determinations, summary judgments, transcripts, and other legal documents necessary in
grievance proceedings;
(4) the use, calling, attendance, participation, and fees of witnesses in
grievance proceedings;
(5) continuances of grievance proceedings;
(6) procedures in jurisdictional and evidentiary hearings, unless governed by Title 63, Chapter 46b, the Administrative Procedures Act;
(7) the presence of media representatives at grievance proceedings; and
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(8) procedures for sealing files or making data pertaining to a grievance unavailable to the public.
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-203, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 9.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-

came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

67-19a-204. Administrator — Powers.
(1) The board shall employ a person with demonstrated ability to administer personnel policies to assist it in performing the functions specified in this
chapter.
(2) (a) The administrator may:
(i) assign qualified, impartial hearing officers on a per case basis to
adjudicate matters under the jurisdiction of the board;
(ii) subpoena witnesses, documents, and other evidence in conjunction with any inquiry, investigation, hearing, or other proceeding;
and
(iii) upon motion made by a party or person to whom the subpoena
is directed and upon notice to the party who issued the subpoena,
quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable, requires an excessive number of witnesses, or requests evidence not relevant to any
matter in issue,
(b) In selecting and assigning hearing officers under authority of this
section; the administrator shall appoint hearing officers that have demonstrated by education, training, and experience the ability to adjudicate
and resolve personnel administration disputes by applying employee relations principles within a large, public work force.
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-204, enacted by
L. 1989, eh. 191, § 10; 1991, ch. 101, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, added Subsection (2)(a)(iii) and made related changes.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 191 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

PART 3
GRIEVANCE AND APPEAL PROCEDURES
67-19a-301. Charges submissible under grievance and appeals procedure.
(1) This grievance procedure may only be used by career service employees
who are not:
(a) public applicants for a position with the state's work force;
(b) public employees of the state's political subdivisions;
(c) public employees covered by other grievance procedures; or
(d) employees of state institutions of higher education.
(2) Whenever a question or dispute exists as to whether an employee is
qualified to use this grievance procedure, the administrator shall resolve the
question or dispute. The administrator's decision is reviewable only by the
Court of Appeals.
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(3) Any career service employee may submit a grievance based upon a
claim or charge of injustice or oppression, including dismissal from employment, resulting from an act, occurrence, omission, or condition for solution
through the grievance procedures set forth in this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-301, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 11; 1991, ch. 101, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, added Subsections (1) and (2) and designated the former section as Subsection (3).

Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

67-19a-302. Levels of appealability of charges submissible
under grievance and appeals procedure.
(1) A career service employee may grieve promotions, dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written reprimands, wages, salary, violations of personnel
rules, issues concerning the equitable administration of benefits, reductions
in force, and disputes concerning abandonment of position to all levels of
grievance procedure.
(2) (a) A career service employee may grieve all other matters only to the
level of his department head.
(b) The decision of the department head is final and unappealable to
the board.
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-302, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 12; 1991, ch. 204, § 9.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted "A
career service" for "An aggrieved" in Subsection (1).

Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

67-19a-303. Employees' rights in grievance and appeals
procedure.
(1) For the purpose of processing a grievance, a career service employee
may:
(a) obtain assistance by a representative of the employee's choice to act
as an advocate at any level of the grievance procedure;
(b) request a reasonable amount of time during work hours to confer
with the representative and prepare the grievance; and
(c) call other employees as witnesses at a grievance hearing.
(2) The state shall allow employees to attend and testify at the grievance
hearing as witnesses if the employee has given reasonable advance notice to
his immediate supervisor.
(3) No person may take any reprisals against any career service employee
for use of grievance procedures specified in this chapter.
(4) (a) The employing agency of an employee who files a grievance may not
place grievance forms, grievance materials, correspondence about the
grievance, agency and department replies to the grievance, or other documents relating to the grievance in the employee's personnel file.
(b) The employing agency of an employee who files a grievance may
place records of disciplinary action in the employee's personnel file.
(c) If any disciplinary action against an employee is rescinded through
the grievance procedures established in this chapter, the agency and the
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Department of Human Resource Management shall remove the record of
the disciplinary action from the employee's agency personnel file and
central personnel file.
(d) An agency may maintain a separate grievance file relating to an
employee's grievance, but shall discard the file after three years.
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-303, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 13; 1991, ch. 204, § 10.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted "a
career service" for wanw in Subsection (1).

Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

PART 4
PROCEDURAL STEPS TO BE FOLLOWED BY
AGGRIEVED EMPLOYEE
67-19a-401. Time limits for submission of appeal by aggrieved employee — Voluntary termination of
employment — Group grievances,
(1) Subject to the standing requirements contained in Part 3 and the restrictions contained in this part, a career service employee may have a grievance addressed by following the procedures specified in this part.
(2) The employee and the person to whom the grievance is directed may
agree in writing to waive or extend grievance steps 2, 3, or 4 or the time limits
specified for those grievance steps, as outlined in Section 67-19a-402.
(3) Any writing made pursuant to Subsection (2) must be submitted to the
administrator.
(4) (a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect
established by rule, if the employee fails to process the grievance to the
next step within the time limits established in this part, he has waived
his right to process the grievance or to obtain judicial review of the grievance.
(b) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect
established by rule, if the employee fails to process the grievance to the
next step within the time limits established in this part, the grievance is
considered to be settled based on the decision made at the last step.
(5) (a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect
established by rule, an employee may submit a grievance for review under this chapter only if the employee submits the grievance:
(i) within 20 working days after the event giving rise to the grievance; or
(ii) within 20 working days after the employee has knowledge of
the event giving rise to the grievance,
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (4)(a), an employee may not submit a
grievance more than one year after the event giving rise to the grievance.
(6) A person who has voluntarily terminated his employment with the state
may not submit a grievance after he has terminated his employment.
(7) (a) When several employees allege the same grievance, they may submit a group grievance by following the procedures and requirements of
this chapter.
149
- 8 -

67-19a-402

STATE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

(b) In submitting a group grievance, each aggrieved employee shall
sign the complaint.
(c) The administrator and board may not treat a group grievance as a
class action, but may select one aggrieved employee's grievance and address that grievance as a test case.
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-401, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 14; 1991, ch. 101, § 6;
1991, ch. 204, § 11.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment by ch. 101, effective April 29, 1991, substituted "grievance steps 2, 3, or 4 or the time
limits specified for those grievance steps, as
outlined in Section 67-19a-402" for "any grievance step or the time limits specified for any
grievance step" at the end of Subsection (2);
added present Subsection (3); and redesignated

former Subsections (3) to (6) as present Subsections (4) to (7).
The 1991 amendment by ch. 204, effective
April 29, 1991, substituted wa career service"
for "an aggrieved" in Subsection (1).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

67-19a-402. Procedural steps to be followed by aggrieved
employee.
(1) (a) A career service employee who believes he has a grievance shall
attempt to resolve the grievance through discussion with his supervisor.
(b) Within five days after the employee discusses the grievance with
him, the employee's supervisor may issue a verbal decision on the grievance.
(2) (a) If the grievance remains unanswered for five working days after its
submission, or if the aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the supervisor's verbal decision, the employee may resubmit the grievance in writing
to his immediate supervisor within five working days after the expiration
of the period for response or receipt of the 'decision, whichever is first.
(b) Within five working days after the employee's written grievance is
submitted, the employee's supervisor shall issue a written response to the
grievance stating his decision and the reasons for the decision.
(c) Immediately after submitting the written grievance to his supervisor, the employee shall notify the administrator of the board that he has
submitted the written grievance.
(3) (a) If the written grievance submitted to the employee's supervisor remains unanswered for five working days after its submission, or if the
aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the decision issued, the employee
may submit the grievance in writing to his agency or division director
within ten working days after the expiration of the period for decision or
receipt of the decision, whichever is first.
(b) Within five working days after the employee's written grievance is
submitted, the employee's agency or division director shall issue a written
response to the grievance stating his decision and the reasons for the
decision.
(4) (a) If the written grievance submitted to the employee's agency or division director remains unanswered for five working days after its submission, or if the aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the decision issued,
the employee may submit the grievance in writing to his department
head within ten working days after the expiration of the period for decision or receipt of the decision, whichever is first.
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(b) Within ten working days after the employee's written grievance is
submitted, the department head shall issue a written response to the
grievance stating his decision and the reasons for the decision.
(c) The decision of the department head is final in all matters except
those matters that the board may review under the authority of Part 3.
(5) If the written grievance submitted to the employee's department head
meets the subject matter requirements of Section 67-19a-302 and if the grievance remains unanswered for ten working days after its submission, or if the
aggrieved employee is dissatisfied with the decision issued, the employee may
submit the grievance in writing to the administrator within ten working days
after the expiration of the period for decision or receipt of the decision, whichever is first.
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-402, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 15; 1989 (2nd S.S.), ch. 3,
§ 2; 1991, ch. 204, § 12.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 (2nd S.S.)
amendment, effective October 10,1989, substituted "ten working days" for "five working
days" in Subsection (4)(b).

The 1991 amendment, effective April 29,
1991, substituted WA career service" for "An" in
Subsection (l)(a).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 bec a m e effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
U t a h Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

67-19a-403. Appeal to administrator — Jurisdictional
hearing.
(1) At any time after a career service employee submits a grievance to the
administrator under the authority of Section 67-19a-402, the administrator
may attempt to settle the grievance informally by conference, conciliation,
and persuasion with the employee and the agency.
(2) (a) When an employee submits a grievance to the administrator under
the authority of Section 67-19a-402, the administrator shall determine:
(i) whether or not the employee is a career service employee and is
entitled to use the grievance system;
(ii) whether or not the board has jurisdiction over the grievance;
(iii) whether or not the employee has been directly harmed; and
(iv) the issues to be heard,
(b) In order to make the determinations required by Subsection (2), the
administrator may:
(i) hold a jurisdictional hearing, where the parties may present
oral arguments, written arguments, or both; or
(ii) conduct an administrative review of the file.
(3) (a) If the administrator holds a jurisdictional hearing, he shall issue his
written decision within 15 days after the hearing is adjourned.
(b) If the administrator chooses to conduct an administrative review of
the file, he shall issue his written decision within 15 days after he receives the grievance.
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-403, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 16; 1991, ch. 204, § 13.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, added present
Subsection (2)(a)(i) and redesignated former

Subsections (2)(a)(i) through (2)(a)(iii) as
present Subsections (2)(a)(ii) through (2)(a)(iv)
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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67-19a-404. Administrator's responsibilities.
If the administrator determines that the grievance meets the jurisdictional
requirements of Part 3, he shall:
(1) appoint a hearing officer to adjudicate the complaint; and
(2) set a date for the hearing that is either:
(a) not later than 30 days after the date the administrator issues
his decision that the board has jurisdiction over the grievance; or
(b) at a date agreed upon by the parties and the administrator.
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-404, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 17.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-

came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

67-19a-405. Prehearing conference.
(1) The administrator may require the presence of each party, the representatives of each party, and other designated persons at a prehearing conference.
(2) At the conference, the administrator may require the parties to:
(a) identify which allegations are admitted and which allegations are
denied;
(b) submit a joint statement detailing:
(i) stipulated facts that are not in dispute;
(ii) the issues to be decided; and
(iii) applicable laws and rules;
(c) submit a list of witnesses, exhibits, and papers or other evidence
that each party intends to offer as evidence; and
(d) confer in an effort to resolve or settle the grievance.
(3) At the conclusion of the prehearing conference,' the administrator may
require the parties to prepare a written statement identifying:
(a) the items presented or agreed to under Subsection (2); and
(b) the issues remaining to be resolved by the hearing process.
(4) The prehearing conference is informal and is not open to the public or
press.
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-405, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 18.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-

came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

67-19a-406. Procedural steps to be followed by aggrieved
employee — Hearing before hearing officer —
Evidentiary and procedural rules.
(1) (a) The administrator shall employ a certified court reporter to record
the hearing and prepare an official transcript of the hearing.
(b) The official transcript of the proceedings and all exhibits, briefs,
motions, and pleadings received by the hearing officer are the official
record of the proceeding.
(2) (a) The agency has the burden of proof in all grievances resulting from
dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written reprimands, reductions in
force, and disputes concerning abandonment of position.
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(b) The employee has the burden of proof in all other grievances.
(c) The party with the burden of proof must prove their case by substantial evidence.
(3) (a) The hearing officer shall issue a written decision within 20 working
days after the hearing is adjourned.
(b) If the hearing officer does not issue a decision within 20 working
days, the agency that is a party to the grievance is not liable for any
claimed back wages or benefits after the date the decision is due.
(4) The hearing officer may:
(a) not award attorneys' fees or costs to either party;
(b) close a hearing by complying with the procedures and requirements
of Title 52, Chapter 4, Open and Public Meetings Act;
(c) seal the file and the evidence produced at the hearing if the evidence raises questions about an employee's character, professional competence, or physical or mental health;
(d) grant continuances according to board rule; and
(e) decide questions or disputes concerning standing in accordance with
Section 67-19a-301.
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-406, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 19; 1991, ch. 101, § 7.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, inserted the
subdivision designation "(a)" in Subsection (4);
designated former Subsections (5) and (6) as
present Subsections (4)(b) and (4)(c); added

Subsections (4)(d) and (4)(e); and made stylistic
changes and appropriate changes in phraseology.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 became effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const. Art. VI Sec. 25.

67-19a-407, Appeal to Career Service Review Board.
(1) (a) The employee or the agency may appeal the hearing officer's decision on a grievance to the board if:
(i) the appealing party files a notice of appeal with the administrator within ten working days after the receipt of the decision or the
expiration of the period for decision, whichever is first; and
(ii) the appealing party meets the requirements for appeal established in Subsection (2).
(b) The appealing party shall submit a copy of the official transcript of
the hearing to the administrator.
(2) The employee or the agency may appeal the hearing officer's decision on
a grievance to the board only if the appealing party alleges that:
(a) the hearing officer did not issue a decision within 20 working days
after the hearing adjourned;
(b) the appealing party is dissatisfied with the decision;
(c) the appealing party believes that the decision was based upon an
incorrect or arbitrary interpretation of the facts; or
(d) the appealing party believes that the hearing officer made an erroneous conclusion of law.
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-407, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 20.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-

came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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67-19a-408. Career Service Review Board hearing — Evidentiary and procedural rules.
(1) The board shall:
(a) hold a hearing to review the hearing officer's decision not later than
30 days after it receives the official transcript and the briefs;
(b) review the decision of the hearing officer by considering the official
record of that hearing and the briefs of the parties; and
(c) issue its written decision addressing the hearing officer's decision
within 40 working days after the record for its proceeding is closed.
(2) In addition to whatever other remedy the board grants, it may order
that the employee be placed on the reappointment roster provided for by
Section 67-19-17 for assignment to another agency.
(3) If the board does not issue its written decision within 40 working days
after closing the record, the agency that is a party to the grievance is not
liable for any claimed back wages or benefits after the date the decision is due.
(4) The board may not award attorneys' fees or costs to either party.
(5) The board may close a hearing by complying with the procedures and
requirements of Title 52, Chapter 4, the Open and Public Meetings Act.
(6) The board may seal the file and the evidence produced at the hearing if
the evidence raises questions about an employee's character, professional
competence, or physical or mental health.
History: C. 1953, 67-19a-408, enacted by
L. 1989, ch. 191, § 21.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 191 be-

came effective on April 24, 1989, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

CHAPTER 19b
SUGGESTION AWARDS PROGRAM
Section
67-19b-204.
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67-19b-101.
67-19b-102.

67-19b-205.
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Part 2
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67-19b-201. Director's responsibilities —
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67-19b-202. Utah Suggestion Awards Board
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAWN ALUMBAUGH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

UTAH STATE INSURANCE
DEPARTMENT, by and through
its Commissioner and
Authorized Representative,
HAROLD C. YANCEY,

Civil No.

920900062CV

Judge Richard H. Moffat

Defendant.

The above captioned matter came on for hearing before
this Court for oral argument on defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint on June 12, 1992, at the hour of 9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff was represented by David H. Schwobe.

Defendant was

represented by Dan R. Larsen and Steven G. Schwendiman, Assistant
Attorneys General.

Having reviewed the memorandums and heard the

arguments of counsel, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED
as follows:
1.

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint

is granted for the reason that plaintiff has failed to exhaust
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the administrative and statutory remedies for the review of
grievance procedures.
2.

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is dismissed without

prejudice.
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FORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD OF THE STATE OF UTAH
In The Matter Of:
JURISDICTIONAL
DECISION AND
SUMMARY RULING

DAWN ALUMBAUGH,
Grievant.

Case No. J.H. 38 (1990)
On May 11, 1990, Dawn Alumbaugh ("Grievant"), filed a request to advance her
grievance, dated April 5, 1990, to the Step 5/evidentiary level of the State Employees'
Grievance and Appeal Procedures. (Utah Code Ann. §§67-19a et seq.) Ms. Alumbaugh
filed a timely request with the Career Service Review Board Office ("CSRB"). However,
it is appropriate to examine and determine whether Grievant's April 5, 1990 grievance
qualifies for advancement beyond the level of the department head at Step 4 of the
Grievance Procedures. Consequently, this administrative review is being conducted pursuant
to §67-19a-403(2), with particular reference to paragraphs (b)(ii) of the just-cited statutory
section.
BACKGROUND
Grievant's original statement of grievance reads as follows:
I had worked in my past position as a satisfied employee for
6 years. My performance evaluations have all been satisfactory
until our division received a new supervisor. Problems
developed due to [me] not meeting [my] supervisor's
expectations and not receiving adequate training. I informed
her supervisor of the problems [that] I was experiencing and he
informed me that he sympathized with my situation and would
talk to the Personnel Director about a solution. He did ask
[me] if I wanted to talk with her but realizing the consequences,
I opted not to.
Grievant then continued her statement of grievance on an accompanying sheet of paper,
most of which constitutes Ms. Alumbaugh's version of how she came to be transferred from
a position in the Insurance Department's ("Department") Solvency and Surveillance Division
("Solvency Division") to another position, one which is in the Market Conduct Division.
Grievant further stated: "I was not given the opportunity to meet performance standards
Exhibit "A

nn/17

Tfa my previous position, as there weje none writien as a guideline for me to follow and
meet" Additionally, Ms. Alumbaugh asserted that management had failed to comply with
Department of Human Resource Management's ("DHRM") rule R468-10-2(l). This rule
states that: 'The supervisor shall discuss the substandard performance with the employee in
an attempt to discover the reasons therefore and set forth an appropriate written plan."
Grievant claims that management failed to fully comply with this rule prior to her position
transfer. Ms. Alumbaugh concluded her statement of grievance by writing: !II want to make
it clear that I am grieving the way this administrative action was handled, as if proper steps
would have been administered, I would have had the opportunity to make adjustments in
my performance to meet expectations of the position."
Moreover, Grievant stated her remedy or relief as follows: "Desk Audit to Insurance
Technician II, Grade 17.

Damages for emotional distress, embarrassment.

Equal

consideration for salary upgrades in the future."
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW
The undersigned has determined that an administrative review of the record (i.e.,
case file) is sufficient to reach a determination on the jurisdictional issues at
§67-19a-403(2)(a).

The following pieces of correspondence adequately represent the

positions of the Grievant and management:
Grievance and attachment, dated April 5
Step 2 Reply, Vanna Hunter to Dawn Alumbaugh, dated April 19
Employee Performance Review for Grievant, dated April 6
Grievant to Undersigned, dated April 12
Step 3 Reply, Lennard Stillman to Grievant, dated April 20
Grievant to Harold Yancey, dated April 17
Step 4 Reply, Harold Yancey to Grievant, dated May 10
Appeal to Step 5, Grievant to Undersigned, dated May 11
The file record also contains several other documents, which are not germane to the
ultimate issue under consideration, which is whether Grievant is entitled to advance her
2
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grievance to Step 5.
FINDINGS
Concededly, there are some discrepancies with regard to the factual situation of when
certain meetings were held and of the exact content or discussions that occurred. The
undersigned has carefully examined the above-ciled documents. The following findings of
fact represent this examiner's best efforts to sort out the factual background. Conceivably,
there may indeed be some slight errors, but the overall substance is corroborated in the
documents.
1.

The Department created a new Solvency Division in November 1989.

Lennard Stillman was appointed as division director. Vanna Hunter was appointed to be
a supervisor over one of the two sections within that division. Ms. Hunter was assigned to
supervise Ms. Alumbaugh. The latter substantially continued with her same duties and
responsibilities which she had performed prior to the reorganization, but there were also
some new procedures and tasks assigned to her. ^ 0 -r fi> a o rs* -><<*sC - /-'- /. " ^ v^'vt

,^***<*:

' A M ' / - *

'';^*<

^ ^ - / ^ \

2. According to Ms. Alumbaugh, she met with Mr. Stillman on February 20 and
explained to him the problems f,[she] was having with the training practices [she] received
under Ms. Hunter." Mr. Stillman placed this meeting in "approximately early March 1990."
The discrepancy in dates is of minor import, and conceivably more than one meeting may
have occurred. n<\
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3. Both Ms. Alumbaugh and Mr. Stillman concur that Grievant expressed some
dissatisfaction with being supervised by Ms. Hunter. Mr. Stillman proposed finding another
position in the Department for Grievant, and she agreed to his suggestion. Soon thereafter,
Mr. Stillman discussed Grievant's dissatisfaction and problems with Olga Tsakakis,
Personnel Coordinator/Director of Administrative Services.

Ms. Tsakakis offered to

evaluate the request of a reassignment for Ms. Alumbaugh. Ms. Tsakakis then considered
the idea of reassigning two Insurance Tech 15 incumbents (Ms. Alumbaugh and
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Ms. Christcnsen) after she considered the skills and abilities of both women.

Later,

Ms. Tsakakis determined that it would be in the best interests of the Department to have
Ms. Alumbaugh and Sandra Christensen each accept a mutual exchange of positions within
the Department. Ms. Tsakakis then made the same recommendation to Commissioner
Harold C. Yancey.
4. On March 20, Commissioner Yancey met with the Grievant and discussed with
Ms. Alumbaugh the prospect of a job-swap between her position and Ms. Christensen's
position. The Commissioner's account of that meeting is that while Ms. Christensen wanted
the weekend to "think it over," Ms. Alumbaugh made an "on-the-spot" decision to accept the

MT^

-I.

reassignment of positions. Mr. Stillman's account is similar in that he stated that while \>tt+'* '
Grievant would have liked to stay in the Solvency Division, Grievant also acknowledged that
•£/& ^ , c a

she "wouldjiccept a change irrespective of duties." A few days later, the Commissioner ^ ^ ^ >
again met at length with Ms. Alumbaugh regarding the proposed transfer, which in fact, gave
her some additional time to think about the exchange.

T

f\ ^^.,

•

5. There has been no showing of coercion with respect to Grievant's transfer. She

^c

discussed the proposal beforehand with Commissioner Yancey, Mr. Stillman, and p « ^ " '

Ms, Tsakakis according to three different accounts. Grievant wrote on April 17 to the \y/si
undersigned that, "At no time did I ever request the action that Mr. Stillman referred to as ^ ^
a transfer." Ms. Alumbaugh's statement appears to be accurate; she did not raise the

''/
7/

T H/-*

transfer prospect, but Mr. Stillman did. However, there is no showing of evidence that she

^

objected to the prospect of a transfer, when she discussed it with Mr. Stillman, Ms. Tsakakis, f^rr & ^r
and Commissioner Yancey. The accounts by Commissioner Yancey and Mr. Stillman state

r

£u^r

that Grievant willingly and knowingly accepted the new assignment in the Market Conduct £p L^t\
Division. Regardless, even if Grievant had forthrightly objected to the change of duties and/ ^ ^ N"
assignments between the two divisions, management has sufficient discretion to direct and Wofe n^{
control the work force>jndkidinj^^

duties and responsibilities as long as' ^

the assigned duties arjj^jihin.the.cojitex^^

minimum qualifications and

the assigned work is within the scope of the appropriate DHRM class specification. (See
DHRM R468-2-3 and R468-5-5.(5).) Indeed, the personnel action taken in the instant case

-19.
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(alls within the ambit of both "Reassignment" as well as "Transfer" as those terms are
defined in DHRM R468-1-1 Definitions.

^ ^^ _

6. Grievant's now former supervisor, Ms. Hunter, did not initiate Grievant's transfer
from the Solvency Division. Even if Ms. Hunter had wanted to transfer Grievant into the
other division, she clearly lacked such authority.
7.

Grievant asserts that management violated DHRM R468-10-2.(l) by the

supervisor (Ms. Hunter) not previously discussing substandard performance with Grievant
prior to implementing the corrective action of a transfer under R468-10-2.(2)(d). However,
there has been no showing that a Corrective Action Plan was either implemented or even
contemplated at any time. Quite the contrary, Ms. Hunter's Step 2 reply and Mr. Stillman's
Step 3 reply stated explicitly that no Corrective Action Plan had been implemented on
Ms. Alumbaugh; nor does Commissioner Yancey's Step 4 reply mention such an action.
As there was no implementation of a Corrective Action Plan, there could have been no
violation of a rule pertaining to the implementation of a Corrective Action Plan, as claimed
by Grievant.
8.

Cc&ttt-ri^t?

^ ^ ^ N ,

^M.V/.C;

i-fcuc- zz&s M / <-\ AL r/ ^-M-C D

Ms. Alumbaugh received an employee performance review for the period

October 1, 1989, though April 1, 1990, from Supervisor Hunter, which Grievant signed on
April 9, 1990. This just-mentioned review evaluated Grievant's job performance as being
overall satisfactory for the six months' period. Grievant received the review after she had
transferred to her new position in the Market Conduct Division. Grievant claims that:
(1) she was not given an opportunity to meet performance standards, (2) she did not receive
adequate training guidelines prior to the transfer, and (3) that the evaluation was based
upon a training period that lasted only approximately one month. By accepting a transfer
outside of Supervisor Hunter's area of responsibility, Grievant's complaints on the
evaluation process are moot although it was not inappropriate for management to evaluate
Ms. Alumbaugh's performance for the period of work performed in the Solvency Division.
Opportunity was afforded for Grievant to comment on the evaluation, which she did.
DHRM R468-2-5.(3) also provides state employees with the opportunity to challenge,

-J-
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fcorrtci, or amend any information in the individual's personnel file.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Utah Code Annotated §67-19a-301 states: "Any career service employee may
submit a grievance based upon a claim or charge of injustice or oppression, including
dismissal from employment, resulting from an act, occurrence, omission, or condition for
solution through the grievance procedures set forth in this chapter." Ms. Alumbaugh's
grievance of April 5, 1990, falls within this ambit.
2. §67-19a-302 states:
(1) An aggrieved employee may grieve promotions,
dismissals, demotions, suspensions, written reprimands, wages,
salary, violations of personneJLr.ulcs, issues concerning the
equitable administration of benefits, reductions in force, and
disputes concerning abandonment of position to all levels of the
grievance procedures.
(2)(a) A career service employee may grieve all other
matters only to the level of his department head.
(b) The decision of the department head is final and
unappealable to the board.
The Career Service Review Board lacks jurisdiction to hear Grievant's gravamen at
Step 5 of the Grievance Procedures, and Grievant lacks standing to process her grievance
to Step 5 for an evidentiary hearing because her grievance does not comport with
§67-19a-302(l).

~~

3. A complaint or grievance based upon the personnel action of a transfer or
reassignment may not qualify on its face for advancement to the Step 5/evidentiary level of
the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures; nor does §67-19a-302 permit
grievances basedj^jDryDerform^^

be advanced beyond Step 4.

4. Furthermore, it is concluded that Grievant's requested remedies are inappropriate
6
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to the Grievance Procedures based on the following:
(a) Requests for desk audits and all classification appeals are not within the
scope of the Insurance Department, but require application to DHRM (§67-19-31
and R468-4-5), nor do these matters come under the jurisdiction of the CSRB.
(b) The CSRB lacks remedy powers over monetary awards for embarrassment
and emotional distress. Such complaints may be petitioned through the general
courts. The CSRB may not even award attorney's fees. (§67-19a-408(4).)

(c) Any future salary increases are a prospective (future-oriented) matter, and
the award or lack of award of future increases can only be treated at the time of
occurrence.

Grievant's requested remedy anent future salary increases is now

premature. A grievance may always be filed coincident with any future award or the
denial of an award on salary increase matters, but there is no present injury or harm
cited in the instant grievance which may be treated at this lime.

DECISION

The instant grievance is hereby summarily dismissed from the docket of the Career
Service Review Board with prejudice. (R140-1-16 F.) This ruling constitutes final agency
action on this matter for purposes of the

Utah Administrative

Procedures

Act,

§63-46b-14(3)(a).

DATED this 21st day of May, 1990.

Robert N. White
Administrator
Career Service Review Board
For any judicial review of this Jurisdictional Decision and Summary Ruling, petition
must be made within 30 days from the date of issuance with the Utah Court of Appeals.
—
(§§63-46b-14 and 63-46b-16.)
~
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